

Towards common groundwater management - the case of Copiapo in Northern Chile

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
Chile's Water Regulation (1981 WC)

- Sophisticated water legislation
 - Creation and application of individual groundwater use rights
 - Strong property right protection
 - Transferable
 - Bipartite governance
- Assumes
 - State has capacity to
 - Calculate and impose Sustainable Abstraction Limit (SAL)
 - Sharing SAL among the various users – Individual WR
 - Establish reallocation mechanisms – WR markets
 - Define rules to adjust WR volume – Water sharing (WUAs, State has little power)
 - Establish efficient enforcement strategy (WUAs, State has little power)
 - Effective collective water management by users


Copiapó Valley




Chile



Copiapó Valley Aquifer




Longitudinal section of the aquifer, showing the various sectors




Groundwater crisis in Copiapo Valley

- Economic Growth



Collapse of the water table

- Withdrawals exceed recharge of 4 m³ / s



Source Hydromas 2013


- Last 22 years reserve lost 830 million m³

The origins of the crisis

- Limited knowledge of the groundwater
 - Significant number of major studies alerted authorities danger overexploitation
 - Mixed conclusions of consequences
 - 1980 study warned overdraft of 18%
 - 1987 study *“reservoir can be worked for next 50 years, including during droughts, without a significant fall in piezometric levels”*.
- Arguments for
 - Users pressure State to grant WR
 - Government maintain investments mining

The origins of the crisis

- Legal complexity and political pressures



The origins of the crisis

- Poorly-defined water permits
 - Use Factor

Activity	Use factor		Volume consumed per l/sec granted	
	Theoretical	Actual	Theoretical	Actual
Agriculture	20%	40%	7,900 m ³	12,600 m ³
Drinking water	75%	100%	23,650 m ³	31,500 m ³
Mines and Industry	75%	100%	23,650 m ³	31,500 m ³

The origins of the crisis

- Compliance and enforcement problems
 - Responsibility WUAs
 - Few users have installed measuring equipment
 - Weak social norm
- DGA
 - Little power
 - Random monitoring \Rightarrow low detection probability
 - 7 last 12 years

The origins of the crisis

- Inconsistency between the management of surface water and groundwater



Emergence of collective management

- Inherited Water User Associations

- Effective collective management

- Ground Water Association

- Important Water Code

- First in 2000 – CA


- Low participation

- Collective management

- Lengthened 2

- 15 Increase

- 2012 – 2015 4 new GWUAs



Concluding Remarks

- Existence of highly sophisticated water legislation
 - Does not ensure sustainable GW management
- WR management scheme
 - Inevitable over-allocation situation
 - State must prepare for this
 - Properly defined WR – Volumetric
- Need for crisis-management mechanism
 - Piezometric warning levels - trigger a restriction or a temporary prohibition (France) or automatic reduction authorized volumes following year (Australia)

Concluding Remarks

- Assumption State has capacity
 - Requirement is not ensured even in countries with
 - Long water management tradition
 - Sophisticated water laws and
 - Well organized State agencies in charge of water management

Thank You